Derivatives and Risk Management Made Simple

No, the British did not steal $45 trillion from India

This is an updated copy of the version on BadHistory. I plan to update it in accordance with the feedback I got.
I'd like to thank two people who will remain anonymous for helping me greatly with this post (you know who you are)
Three years ago a festschrift for Binay Bhushan Chaudhuri was published by Shubhra Chakrabarti, a history teacher at the University of Delhi and Utsa Patnaik, a Marxist economist who taught at JNU until 2010.
One of the essays in the festschirt by Utsa Patnaik was an attempt to quantify the "drain" undergone by India during British Rule. Her conclusion? Britain robbed India of $45 trillion (or £9.2 trillion) during their 200 or so years of rule. This figure was immensely popular, and got republished in several major news outlets (here, here, here, here (they get the number wrong) and more recently here), got a mention from the Minister of External Affairs & returns 29,100 results on Google. There's also plenty of references to it here on Reddit.
Patnaik is not the first to calculate such a figure. Angus Maddison thought it was £100 million, Simon Digby said £1 billion, Javier Estaban said £40 million see Roy (2019). The huge range of figures should set off some alarm bells.
So how did Patnaik calculate this (shockingly large) figure? Well, even though I don't have access to the festschrift, she conveniently has written an article detailing her methodology here. Let's have a look.
How exactly did the British manage to diddle us and drain our wealth’ ? was the question that Basudev Chatterjee (later editor of a volume in the Towards Freedom project) had posed to me 50 years ago when we were fellow-students abroad.
This is begging the question.
After decades of research I find that using India’s commodity export surplus as the measure and applying an interest rate of 5%, the total drain from 1765 to 1938, compounded up to 2016, comes to £9.2 trillion; since $4.86 exchanged for £1 those days, this sum equals about $45 trillion.
This is completely meaningless. To understand why it's meaningless consider India's annual coconut exports. These are almost certainly a surplus but the surplus in trade is countered by the other country buying the product (indeed, by definition, trade surpluses contribute to the GDP of a nation which hardly plays into intuitive conceptualisations of drain).
Furthermore, Dewey (2019) critiques the 5% interest rate.
She [Patnaik] consistently adopts statistical assumptions (such as compound interest at a rate of 5% per annum over centuries) that exaggerate the magnitude of the drain
Moving on:
The exact mechanism of drain, or transfers from India to Britain was quite simple.
Convenient.
Drain theory possessed the political merit of being easily grasped by a nation of peasants. [...] No other idea could arouse people than the thought that they were being taxed so that others in far off lands might live in comfort. [...] It was, therefore, inevitable that the drain theory became the main staple of nationalist political agitation during the Gandhian era.
- Chandra et al. (1989)
The key factor was Britain’s control over our taxation revenues combined with control over India’s financial gold and forex earnings from its booming commodity export surplus with the world. Simply put, Britain used locally raised rupee tax revenues to pay for its net import of goods, a highly abnormal use of budgetary funds not seen in any sovereign country.
The issue with figures like these is they all make certain methodological assumptions that are impossible to prove. From Roy in Frankema et al. (2019):
the "drain theory" of Indian poverty cannot be tested with evidence, for several reasons. First, it rests on the counterfactual that any money saved on account of factor payments abroad would translate into domestic investment, which can never be proved. Second, it rests on "the primitive notion that all payments to foreigners are "drain"", that is, on the assumption that these payments did not contribute to domestic national income to the equivalent extent (Kumar 1985, 384; see also Chaudhuri 1968). Again, this cannot be tested. [...] Fourth, while British officers serving India did receive salaries that were many times that of the average income in India, a paper using cross-country data shows that colonies with better paid officers were governed better (Jones 2013).
Indeed, drain theory rests on some very weak foundations. This, in of itself, should be enough to dismiss any of the other figures that get thrown out. Nonetheless, I felt it would be a useful exercise to continue exploring Patnaik's take on drain theory.
The East India Company from 1765 onwards allocated every year up to one-third of Indian budgetary revenues net of collection costs, to buy a large volume of goods for direct import into Britain, far in excess of that country’s own needs.
So what's going on here? Well Roy (2019) explains it better:
Colonial India ran an export surplus, which, together with foreign investment, was used to pay for services purchased from Britain. These payments included interest on public debt, salaries, and pensions paid to government offcers who had come from Britain, salaries of managers and engineers, guaranteed profts paid to railway companies, and repatriated business profts. How do we know that any of these payments involved paying too much? The answer is we do not.
So what was really happening is the government was paying its workers for services (as well as guaranteeing profits - to promote investment - something the GoI does today Dalal (2019), and promoting business in India), and those workers were remitting some of that money to Britain. This is hardly a drain (unless, of course, Indian diaspora around the world today are "draining" it). In some cases, the remittances would take the form of goods (as described) see Chaudhuri (1983):
It is obvious that these debit items were financed through the export surplus on merchandise account, and later, when railway construction started on a large scale in India, through capital import. Until 1833 the East India Company followed a cumbersome method in remitting the annual home charges. This was to purchase export commodities in India out of revenue, which were then shipped to London and the proceeds from their sale handed over to the home treasury.
While Roy's earlier point argues better paid officers governed better, it is honestly impossible to say what part of the repatriated export surplus was a drain, and what was not. However calling all of it a drain is definitely misguided.
It's worth noting that Patnaik seems to make no attempt to quantify the benefits of the Raj either, Dewey (2019)'s 2nd criticism:
she [Patnaik] consistently ignores research that would tend to cut the economic impact of the drain down to size, such as the work on the sources of investment during the industrial revolution (which shows that industrialisation was financed by the ploughed-back profits of industrialists) or the costs of empire school (which stresses the high price of imperial defence)

Since tropical goods were highly prized in other cold temperate countries which could never produce them, in effect these free goods represented international purchasing power for Britain which kept a part for its own use and re-exported the balance to other countries in Europe and North America against import of food grains, iron and other goods in which it was deficient.
Re-exports necessarily adds value to goods when the goods are processed and when the goods are transported. The country with the largest navy at the time would presumably be in very good stead to do the latter.
The British historians Phyllis Deane and WA Cole presented an incorrect estimate of Britain’s 18th-19th century trade volume, by leaving out re-exports completely. I found that by 1800 Britain’s total trade was 62% higher than their estimate, on applying the correct definition of trade including re-exports, that is used by the United Nations and by all other international organisations.
While interesting, and certainly expected for such an old book, re-exporting necessarily adds value to goods.
When the Crown took over from the Company, from 1861 a clever system was developed under which all of India’s financial gold and forex earnings from its fast-rising commodity export surplus with the world, was intercepted and appropriated by Britain. As before up to a third of India’s rising budgetary revenues was not spent domestically but was set aside as ‘expenditure abroad’.
So, what does this mean? Britain appropriated all of India's earnings, and then spent a third of it aboard? Not exactly. She is describing home charges see Roy (2019) again:
Some of the expenditures on defense and administration were made in sterling and went out of the country. This payment by the government was known as the Home Charges. For example, interest payment on loans raised to finance construction of railways and irrigation works, pensions paid to retired officers, and purchase of stores, were payments in sterling. [...] almost all money that the government paid abroad corresponded to the purchase of a service from abroad. [...] The balance of payments system that emerged after 1800 was based on standard business principles. India bought something and paid for it. State revenues were used to pay for wages of people hired abroad, pay for interest on loans raised abroad, and repatriation of profits on foreign investments coming into India. These were legitimate market transactions.
Indeed, if paying for what you buy is drain, then several billions of us are drained every day.
The Secretary of State for India in Council, based in London, invited foreign importers to deposit with him the payment (in gold, sterling and their own currencies) for their net imports from India, and these gold and forex payments disappeared into the yawning maw of the SoS’s account in the Bank of England.
It should be noted that India having two heads was beneficial, and encouraged investment per Roy (2019):
The fact that the India Office in London managed a part of the monetary system made India creditworthy, stabilized its currency, and encouraged foreign savers to put money into railways and private enterprise in India. Current research on the history of public debt shows that stable and large colonies found it easier to borrow abroad than independent economies because the investors trusted the guarantee of the colonist powers.

Against India’s net foreign earnings he issued bills, termed Council bills (CBs), to an equivalent rupee value. The rate (between gold-linked sterling and silver rupee) at which the bills were issued, was carefully adjusted to the last farthing, so that foreigners would never find it more profitable to ship financial gold as payment directly to Indians, compared to using the CB route. Foreign importers then sent the CBs by post or by telegraph to the export houses in India, that via the exchange banks were paid out of the budgeted provision of sums under ‘expenditure abroad’, and the exporters in turn paid the producers (peasants and artisans) from whom they sourced the goods.
Sunderland (2013) argues CBs had two main roles (and neither were part of a grand plot to keep gold out of India):
Council bills had two roles. They firstly promoted trade by handing the IO some control of the rate of exchange and allowing the exchange banks to remit funds to India and to hedge currency transaction risks. They also enabled the Indian government to transfer cash to England for the payment of its UK commitments.

The United Nations (1962) historical data for 1900 to 1960, show that for three decades up to 1928 (and very likely earlier too) India posted the second highest merchandise export surplus in the world, with USA in the first position. Not only were Indians deprived of every bit of the enormous international purchasing power they had earned over 175 years, even its rupee equivalent was not issued to them since not even the colonial government was credited with any part of India’s net gold and forex earnings against which it could issue rupees. The sleight-of-hand employed, namely ‘paying’ producers out of their own taxes, made India’s export surplus unrequited and constituted a tax-financed drain to the metropolis, as had been correctly pointed out by those highly insightful classical writers, Dadabhai Naoroji and RCDutt.
It doesn't appear that others appreciate their insight Roy (2019):
K. N. Chaudhuri rightly calls such practice ‘confused’ economics ‘coloured by political feelings’.

Surplus budgets to effect such heavy tax-financed transfers had a severe employment–reducing and income-deflating effect: mass consumption was squeezed in order to release export goods. Per capita annual foodgrains absorption in British India declined from 210 kg. during the period 1904-09, to 157 kg. during 1937-41, and to only 137 kg by 1946.
Dewey (1978) points out reliability issues with Indian agriculutural statistics, however this calorie decline persists to this day. Some of it is attributed to less food being consumed at home Smith (2015), a lower infectious disease burden Duh & Spears (2016) and diversified diets Vankatesh et al. (2016).
If even a part of its enormous foreign earnings had been credited to it and not entirely siphoned off, India could have imported modern technology to build up an industrial structure as Japan was doing.
This is, unfortunately, impossible to prove. Had the British not arrived in India, there is no clear indication that India would've united (this is arguably more plausible than the given counterfactual1). Had the British not arrived in India, there is no clear indication India would not have been nuked in WW2, much like Japan. Had the British not arrived in India, there is no clear indication India would not have been invaded by lizard people, much like Japan. The list continues eternally.
Nevertheless, I will charitably examine the given counterfactual anyway. Did pre-colonial India have industrial potential? The answer is a resounding no.
From Gupta (1980):
This article starts from the premise that while economic categories - the extent of commodity production, wage labour, monetarisation of the economy, etc - should be the basis for any analysis of the production relations of pre-British India, it is the nature of class struggles arising out of particular class alignments that finally gives the decisive twist to social change. Arguing on this premise, and analysing the available evidence, this article concludes that there was little potential for industrial revolution before the British arrived in India because, whatever might have been the character of economic categories of that period, the class relations had not sufficiently matured to develop productive forces and the required class struggle for a 'revolution' to take place.
A view echoed in Raychaudhuri (1983):
Yet all of this did not amount to an economic situation comparable to that of western Europe on the eve of the industrial revolution. Her technology - in agriculture as well as manufacturers - had by and large been stagnant for centuries. [...] The weakness of the Indian economy in the mid-eighteenth century, as compared to pre-industrial Europe was not simply a matter of technology and commercial and industrial organization. No scientific or geographical revolution formed part of the eighteenth-century Indian's historical experience. [...] Spontaneous movement towards industrialisation is unlikely in such a situation.
So now we've established India did not have industrial potential, was India similar to Japan just before the Meiji era? The answer, yet again, unsurprisingly, is no. Japan's economic situation was not comparable to India's, which allowed for Japan to finance its revolution. From Yasuba (1986):
All in all, the Japanese standard of living may not have been much below the English standard of living before industrialization, and both of them may have been considerably higher than the Indian standard of living. We can no longer say that Japan started from a pathetically low economic level and achieved a rapid or even "miraculous" economic growth. Japan's per capita income was almost as high as in Western Europe before industrialization, and it was possible for Japan to produce surplus in the Meiji Period to finance private and public capital formation.
The circumstances that led to Meiji Japan were extremely unique. See Tomlinson (1985):
Most modern comparisons between India and Japan, written by either Indianists or Japanese specialists, stress instead that industrial growth in Meiji Japan was the product of unique features that were not reproducible elsewhere. [...] it is undoubtably true that Japan's progress to industrialization has been unique and unrepeatable
So there you have it. Unsubstantiated statistical assumptions, calling any number you can a drain & assuming a counterfactual for no good reason gets you this $45 trillion number. Hopefully that's enough to bury it in the ground.
1. Several authors have affirmed that Indian identity is a colonial artefact. For example see Rajan 1969:
Perhaps the single greatest and most enduring impact of British rule over India is that it created an Indian nation, in the modern political sense. After centuries of rule by different dynasties overparts of the Indian sub-continent, and after about 100 years of British rule, Indians ceased to be merely Bengalis, Maharashtrians,or Tamils, linguistically and culturally.
or see Bryant 2000:
But then, it would be anachronistic to condemn eighteenth-century Indians, who served the British, as collaborators, when the notion of 'democratic' nationalism or of an Indian 'nation' did not then exist. [...] Indians who fought for them, differed from the Europeans in having a primary attachment to a non-belligerent religion, family and local chief, which was stronger than any identity they might have with a more remote prince or 'nation'.

Bibliography

Chakrabarti, Shubra & Patnaik, Utsa (2018). Agrarian and other histories: Essays for Binay Bhushan Chaudhuri. Colombia University Press
Hickel, Jason (2018). How the British stole $45 trillion from India. The Guardian
Bhuyan, Aroonim & Sharma, Krishan (2019). The Great Loot: How the British stole $45 trillion from India. Indiapost
Monbiot, George (2020). English Landowners have stolen our rights. It is time to reclaim them. The Guardian
Tsjeng, Zing (2020). How Britain Stole $45 trillion from India with trains | Empires of Dirt. Vice
Chaudhury, Dipanjan (2019). British looted $45 trillion from India in today’s value: Jaishankar. The Economic Times
Roy, Tirthankar (2019). How British rule changed India's economy: The Paradox of the Raj. Palgrave Macmillan
Patnaik, Utsa (2018). How the British impoverished India. Hindustan Times
Tuovila, Alicia (2019). Expenditure method. Investopedia
Dewey, Clive (2019). Changing the guard: The dissolution of the nationalist–Marxist orthodoxy in the agrarian and agricultural history of India. The Indian Economic & Social History Review
Chandra, Bipan et al. (1989). India's Struggle for Independence, 1857-1947. Penguin Books
Frankema, Ewout & Booth, Anne (2019). Fiscal Capacity and the Colonial State in Asia and Africa, c. 1850-1960. Cambridge University Press
Dalal, Sucheta (2019). IL&FS Controversy: Centre is Paying Up on Sovereign Guarantees to ADB, KfW for Group's Loan. TheWire
Chaudhuri, K.N. (1983). X - Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments (1757–1947). Cambridge University Press
Sunderland, David (2013). Financing the Raj: The City of London and Colonial India, 1858-1940. Boydell Press
Dewey, Clive (1978). Patwari and Chaukidar: Subordinate officials and the reliability of India’s agricultural statistics. Athlone Press
Smith, Lisa (2015). The great Indian calorie debate: Explaining rising undernourishment during India’s rapid economic growth. Food Policy
Duh, Josephine & Spears, Dean (2016). Health and Hunger: Disease, Energy Needs, and the Indian Calorie Consumption Puzzle. The Economic Journal
Vankatesh, P. et al. (2016). Relationship between Food Production and Consumption Diversity in India – Empirical Evidences from Cross Section Analysis. Agricultural Economics Research Review
Gupta, Shaibal (1980). Potential of Industrial Revolution in Pre-British India. Economic and Political Weekly
Raychaudhuri, Tapan (1983). I - The mid-eighteenth-century background. Cambridge University Press
Yasuba, Yasukichi (1986). Standard of Living in Japan Before Industrialization: From what Level did Japan Begin? A Comment. The Journal of Economic History
Tomblinson, B.R. (1985). Writing History Sideways: Lessons for Indian Economic Historians from Meiji Japan. Cambridge University Press
Rajan, M.S. (1969). The Impact of British Rule in India. Journal of Contemporary History
Bryant, G.J. (2000). Indigenous Mercenaries in the Service of European Imperialists: The Case of the Sepoys in the Early British Indian Army, 1750-1800. War in History
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Noob Safe Haven Thread | Oct 14-20 2019

Post any options questions you wanted to ask, but were afraid to ask. A weekly thread in which questions will be received with equanimity. There are no stupid questions, only dumb answers.   Fire away. This is a weekly rotation with past threads linked below. This project succeeds thanks to people thoughtfully sharing their knowledge and experiences (YOU are invited to respond to questions posted here.)
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I just made (or lost) $____. Should I close the trade? Yes, close the trade, because you had no plan for an exit to limit your risk. Your trade is a prediction: a plan directs action upon an (in)validated prediction. Take the gain (or loss). End the risk of losing the gain (or increasing the loss). Plan the exit before the start of each trade, for both a gain, and maximum loss. • Exit-first trade planning, and using a risk-reduction trade checklist (Redtexture)
Why did my options lose value, when the stock price went in a favorable direction? • Options extrinsic and intrinsic value, an introduction (Redtexture)
Getting started in options • Calls and puts, long and short, an introduction (Redtexture) • Exercise & Assignment - A Guide (ScottishTrader) • Some useful educational links • Some introductory trading guidance, with educational links • Options Expiration & Assignment (Option Alpha) • Expiration time and date (Investopedia)
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Trade planning, risk reduction and trade size, etc. • Exit-first trade planning, and using a risk-reduction trade checklist (Redtexture) • Trade Checklists and Guides (Option Alpha) • An illustration of planning on trades failing. (John Carter) (at 90 seconds) • Trade Simulator Tool (Radioactive Trading) • Risk of Ruin (Better System Trader)
Minimizing Bid-Ask Spreads (high-volume options are best) • Fishing for a price: price discovery with (wide) bid-ask spreads (Redtexture) • List of option activity by underlying (Market Chameleon) • List of option activity by underlying (Barchart) • Open Interest by ticker (optinistics)
Closing out a trade • Most options positions are closed before expiration (Options Playbook) • When to Exit Guide (Option Alpha) • Risk to reward ratios change over the life of a position: a reason for early exit (Redtexture)
Options Greeks and Option Chains • An Introduction to Options Greeks (Options Playbook) • Options Greeks (Epsilon Options) • Theta Decay: The Ultimate Guide (Chris Butler - Project Option) • Theta decay rates differ: At the money vs. away from the money • Theta: A Detailed Look at the Decay of Option Time Value (James Toll) • Gamma Risk Explained - (Gavin McMaster - Options Trading IQ) • How Often Within Expected Move? Data Science and Implied Volatility (Michael Rechenthin, PhD - TastyTrade 2017) • A selected list of option chain & option data websites
Selected Trade Positions & Management • The Wheel Strategy (ScottishTrader) • Rolling Short (Credit) Spreads (Options Playbook) • Rolling Short (Credit) Spreads (Redtexture) • Synthetic option positions: Why and how they are used (Fidelity) • Covered Calls Tutorial (Option Investor) • Covered Calls - Chris Butler - Project Option (20 minutes) • The 10 Most Common Mistakes Made by Covered Call Writers - Allen Ellman - Blue Caller Investor (8 minutes) • Take the loss (here's why) (Clay Trader) (15 minutes) • The diagonal calendar spread and "poor man's covered call" (Redtexture) • Creative Ways to Avoid The Pattern Day Trader Rule (Sean McLaughlin) • Short calls and puts, and dividend risk (Redtexture) • Options and Dividend Risk (Sage Anderson, TastyTrade) • Options contract adjustments: what you should know (Fidelity) • Options contract adjustment announcements / memoranda (Options Clearing Corporation)
Implied Volatility, IV Rank, and IV Percentile (of days) • An introduction to Implied Volatility (Khan Academy) • An introduction to Black Scholes formula (Khan Academy) • IV Rank vs. IV Percentile: Which is better? (Project Option) • IV Rank vs. IV Percentile in Trading (Tasty Trade) (video)
Miscellaneous: Economic Calendars, International Brokers, RobinHood, Pattern Day Trader, CBOE Exchange Rules, Contract Specifications, TDA Margin Handbook, EU Regulations on US ETFs, US Taxes and Options • Selected calendars of economic reports and events • An incomplete list of international brokers dealing in US options markets (Redtexture) • Free brokerages can be very costly: Why option traders should not use RobinHood • Pattern Day Trader status and $25,000 margin account balances (FINRA) • How to find out when a new expiration is opening up: email: [email protected] for the status of a particular ticker's new expirations.
• CBOE Contract Specifications and Trading Days & Hours • TDAmeritrade Margin Handbook (18 pages PDF) • Monthly expirations of Index options are settled on next day prices • PRIIPS, KIPs, EU regulations, ETFs, Options, Brokers • Key Information Documents (KIDs) for European Citizens (Options Clearing Corporation) • Taxes and Investing (Options Industry Council) (PDF) • CBOE Exchange Rules (770+ pages, PDF) • NASDAQ Options Exchange Rules
Following week's Noob thread: Oct 21-27 2019
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Oct 7-13 2019 Sept 30 - Oct 6 2019
Sept 23-29 2019 Sept 16-22 2019 Sept 09-15 2019 Sept 02-09 2019 Aug 26 - Sept 02 2019
Complete NOOB archive, 2018, and 2019
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The XTRD Megathread

What is XTRD?

XTRD is a technology company that are introducing a new infrastructure that would allow banks, hedge funds, and large institutional traders to easily access cryptocurrency markets.
XTRD is launching three separate products in sequential stages to solve the ongoing problems caused by having so many disparate markets. Firstly a unified FIX API followed by XTRD Dark Pools and finally the XTRD Single Point of Access or SPA.
Our goal is to build trading infrastructure in the cyptospace and become one of the first full service shops in the cryptocurrency markets for large traders and funds.

What are the industry issues?

COMPLEX WEB OF EXCHANGES. A combination of differing KYC policies, means of funding, interfaces and APIs results in a fragmented patchwork of liquidity for cryptocurrencies. Trading in an automated fashion with full awareness of best pricing and current liquidity necessitates the opening and use of accounts on multiple exchanges, coding to multiple API’s, following varying funding and withdrawal procedures. Once those hurdles are cleared, market participants must convert fiat currency to BTC or ETH and then forward the ETH on to an exchange that may not accept fiat, necessitating yet another transaction to convert back to fiat. Major concerns for market participants range from unmitigated slippage and counterparty risk to hacking prevention and liquidity.
HIGH FEES. Execution costs are even more of a factor. Typical exchange commissions are in the 0.1% – 0.25% range per transaction (10 to 25 basis points), but the effective fees are much higher when taking into bid and ask spreads maintained by the exchanges. As most exchanges are unregulated, there is generally no central authority or regulator to examine internal exchange orders that separate proprietary activity from customer activity and ensure fair pricing.
THIN LIQUIDITY. A large institutional order, representing a sizable percentage of daily volume can move the market for a product, and related products in an exchange by a factor of 5-10%. That means a single order to buy $1,000,000 worth of bitcoin can cost an extra $50,000-$100,000 per transaction given a lack of liquidity if not managed correctly and executed on only one exchange. By way of comparison, similar trades on FX exchanges barely move markets a fraction of a percent; those price changes cost traders money, and deter investment.

What are the XTRD solutions?

FIX API
An API is an “Application Programming Interface”, a set of rules that computer programs use to communicate. FIX stands for “Financial Information eXchange”, the API standard used by most financial organizations as the intermediary protocol to communicate amongst disparate systems such as market data, execution, trade reporting, and order entry for the past 25 years.XTRD is fixing the problem of having 100 different APIs for 100 exchanges by creating a single FIX based API for market data and execution – the same FIX API that all current financial institutions utilize.XTRD will leverage our data center presences in DC3 Chicago and NY4 New Jersey to host FIX trading clients and reduce their trading latencies to single milliseconds, a time acceleration of 100x when it comes to execution vs internet. More infrastructure and private worldwide internet lines will be added in 2018 and beyond to enable secure, low latency execution for all XTRD clients, FIX and PRO.
XTRD PRO
XTRD PRO is a professional trading platform that will fix the basic problems with trading across crypto exchanges – the need to open multiple web pages, having to click around multiple windows, only being able to use basic order types, and not seeing all your positions, trades, and market data in one place.XTRD PRO will be standalone, downloadable, robust end-to-end encrypted software that will consolidate all market data from exchanges visually into one order book, provide a consolidated position and order view across all your exchange accounts, and enable client side orders not available on exchanges – keyboard macro shortcuts, VWAP/TWAP, shaving the bid and offer, hit through 1% of the inside, reserve orders that bid 100 but show 1, SMART order routing to best exchange and intelligent order splicing across exchanges based on execution costs net of fees, OCO and OTO, many others.
XTRD SPA
XTRD SPA is the solution to bridge cross-exchange liquidity issues. XTRD is creating Joint Venture partnerships with trusted cryptocurrency exchanges to provide clients on those exchanges execution across other exchanges where they do not have accounts by leveraging XTRD’s liquidity pools.An order placed by a client at CEX.IO, XTRD’s first JV partner, can be executed by XTRD at a different exchange where there may be a better price or higher liquidity for a digital asset. Subsequently, XTRD will deliver the position to CEX.IO and then CEX.IO will deliver the execution to the client, with XTRD acting as just another market participant at the CEX.IO exchange.XTRD does not take custody of funds, we are a technology partner with exchanges. All local exchange rules, procedures, and AML/KYC policies apply.
XTRD DARK
Institutions and large market participants who have large orders of 100 BTC or more generally must execute across multiple markets, increasing their counterparty risk, paying enormous commissions and spreads, and generally having to deal with the vagaries of the crypto space. Alternatives are OTC brokers that charge multiple percents or private peer-to-peer swaps which are difficult to effectuate unless one is deeply in the space.XTRD is launching XTRD DARK – a dark liquidity pool to trade crypto vs fiat that matches buyers and sellers of large orders, discreetly and anonymously, at a much lower cost. Liquidity is not displayed so large orders do not move thin markets as they would publicly. The liquidity will come from direct XTRD DARK participants as well as aggregation of retail order flow into block orders, XTRD’s own liquidity pools, connections with decentralized exchanges to effectuate liquidity swaps, and OTC broker order flow.XTRD is partnering with a fiat banking providebroker dealer to onboard all XTRD DARK participants for the fiat currency custody side with full KYC/AML procedures.

XTRD Tokenomics

Who is XTRD intended for?

XTRD is mainly aimed at major institutions, hedge funds, algorithmic traders who are currently unable to enter the crypto markets.
These firms include companies such as Divisa Capital run by XTRD Advisor Mushegh Tovmasyan.

XTRD Weekly Updates

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XTRD In The Media

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If you are interested please email [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected])
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Educator, writer and trader with a private equity fund located in the US. Trading methodology based on astronomical and Gann based time cycles with a focus on price action only charting for trade execution and trade management. Day Trading and Swing Trading the Currency Market by Kathy Lien; The Disciplined Trader by Mark Douglas; Download all forex trading strategies PDF here. The best forex brokers to day trade for a living. To day trade for a living, you need to find the brokers with features that are most suitable for day trading. Since you open and close your ... Forex Risk Management - Free download as Powerpoint Presentation (.ppt), PDF File (.pdf), Text File (.txt) or view presentation slides online. Derivatives and Risk Management made simple 3. Market risk Market risk refers to the sensitivity of an asset or portfolio to overall market price movements such as interest rates, inflation, equities, currency and property. Pension funds are heavily exposed to interest and inflation rate risks as these determine the present value of the scheme’s liabilities; typically these risks are ... A good forex trading strategy allows for a trader to analyse the market and confidently execute trades with sound risk management techniques. Forex Strategies: A Top-level Overview Forex options provide an additional tool for foreign exchange risk management, alongside other commonly used tools such as forward contracts. Options are simple in principle, but their pricing can be complex. Familiarity with the terminology and the basic principles of options trading may be helpful when understanding ways to hedge FX risk in international business. Alternative Trade Management/Money Management Methods 1 reply. Money Management / Risk Management 24 replies. Critique my system please 12 replies. Trendline only system- Please critique 14 replies. Beginner requesting plan critique 5 replies Effective forex management minimizes these economic risks, while providing cash flow to meet everyday expenses and improve earnings. Identification The foreign exchange market refers to the network of individuals, banks and organized financial exchanges that trade global currencies. Risk management is a key component for a successful trading strategy which is often overlooked. By applying risk management techniques, traders can effectively reduce the detrimental effect losing ... Career day traders use a risk-management method called the 1-percent risk rule, or vary it slightly to fit their trading methods. Adherence to the rule keeps capital losses to a minimum when a trader has an off day or experiences harsh market conditions, while still allowing for great monthly returns or income. The 1-percent risk rule makes sense for many reasons, and you can benefit from ...

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Money Management & Risk Management

There are no easy or shortcuts to trading but if you master the concept of wave analysis and use good money/ risk management in your forex trading you will be successful in trading whether that be ... Hello traders! Glad to see you here! In this video, I show you how I personally calculate my risk and what is exactly risk management. It's a key aspect of trading, so make sure you are 100% ... 9. Verschiedene Strategien und Märkte (Dow, NSDQ, Forex und Aktien) 10. Detaillierte Besprechung aller Trades. 11. Planung, Trading Disziplin, Risiko- & Money Management, … 12. Diskussion und ... Risk Management and Position size calculation by www.3stocksonfire.com. I want to show you the concept of risk and money management in the stock market, and that way, you can use it in your own examples. You will become aware of how the stock market business really works. WHY UNDERSTANDING WICKS IN TRADING IS THE MOST IMPORTANT **FOREX-STOCKS-CRYPTOCURRENCY** What Broker Do I recommend? https://bit.ly/2QCWYTD Disclaimer Our co... Get more information about IG US by visiting their website: https://www.ig.com/us/future-of-forex Get my trading strategies here: https://www.robbooker.com C... This Video explains the Different currency quotes in foreign Exchange Management in Financial Management. This video will be helpful for CA, CS, CMA Students. For more information : https://www.educba.com/risk-management-in-banks/ In this VIdeo how risk management in banks is an important concept, what type of risk... Dit is de officiële YouTube account van Geheim over de grens. Ga naar http://www.geheimoverdegrens.nl voor meer informatie. We inspireren je graag met ideeën...

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